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THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976:
RUMINATIONS ON SECTION 2036 AND
THE AFTERMATH OF B YR UM
J. Allen Smith*
"It has been noted

.

.

that the Reform Act amendments of the

estate and gift taxes are exceedingly complex, technically flawed in
many respects, and frequently reflect policy judgments of questionable soundness."
Professor John H. McCord'
"The perhaps surprising conclusion compelled by our findings is
that today's millionaires, .as well as persons of lesser wealth, no more
need pay a stiff estate and gift tax than did their predecessors. It may
be that the real certainties of this world are death and tax avoidance."
Professor George Cooper2

Introduction

A.

The two quotations at the head of this article are examples of
the malaise within the legal profession concerning the lack of clarity
in the gift and estate tax laws. The difficulties do not arise within
the context of the two goals of the gift and estate tax statutes: to
raise revenue and to equalize the distribution of wealth. Rather, the
main problems inhere in the conceptual differences that decision
makers demonstrate in defining and giving operational indices to
such words as "property," "power," "rights," "controls,"
"enjoyment," "transfer," and "intent." These terms are construed
to hamper as well as to assist the larger goals of revenue raising and
of breaking down entrenched wealth.
In this article, Part I discusses primarily one section of the
Internal Revenue Code, section 2036, 3 its interpretation by the SuProfessor of Law, Rutgers University Law School, Newark, New Jersey. B.A., Erskine
College, 1942; LL.B., University of Florida, 1948; S.J.D., Yale University, 1958.
I am indebted for research assistance to Kevin Billet and James Kaiser, third-year
students at Rutgers Law School (Newark).
1. J. MCCORD, 1976 ESTATE AND Gir TAX REFORM 1 (1977). This book reaffirms the
current relevance of LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES (3d ed.
1974).
2. Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 163 (1977).
3. I.R.C. § 2036. References in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended. The discussion will indicate whether the case in point involved the code before or
after the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
*
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preme Court in the important case of United States v. Byrum,4 and
the amendment in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, passed by Congress
in response to the Byrum decision. Byrum provides an excellent
example of the confusion surrounding the definition of the abovementioned terms and also the different conceptual approaches to
the problem of interpreting the Code provisions relating to wealth
transfer. Several decisions, both before and after Byrum, are discussed in order to further illustrate judicial responses to this basic
conceptual conflict.
In response to the Byrum decision, Congress enacted an amendment which expanded the reach of section 2036 to include the retention of a right to vote stock after the stock has been transferred to
a trust. Part I concludes with a discussion of thirteen variations on
the theme of stock transfers in a closely-held corporation. Some of
these variations are now precluded by the amendment.
Part II deals with the problems raised in Part I on a more
general level and recommends several possible solutions. It suggests
wide discussion of these problems in public forums with the hope
of reform at two levels: (1) minor reforms that might immediately
attract the attention of estate planners and judges; and (2) major
reforms to abide the time when Congress again, in a decade or so,
studies the entire topic of inheritance taxation and donative transactions, whether inter vivos or testamentary.

1.

A Preview of BYRUM

In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States, in United
States v. Byrum, held specifically that an owner of stock in three
closely held corporations could make a gift of the stock in trust to
others and thus avoid the estate tax, even though the grantor retained the right to vote the stock in the governance of the corporations. In reaching its decision, the Court construed sections
2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2) of the Code and discussed the term
"managerial and administrative" powers. This term is used
in the
literature to suggest the control over wealth that a donor can keep
without subjecting himself to the estate tax.
In Byrum-type situations, non-taxable administrative and
managerial powers, in addition to retained voting rights in stock, are
of four types. In some instances, the settlor has been able to retain
broad investment powers by his ability to influence investment policy as sole trustee of the stock, or as one of several trustees.5 The
4. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
5. Yeazel v. Coyle, 21 A.F.T.R. 2d 1681 (N.D. I1. 1968); Estate of Willard v. King, 37
T.C. 973 (1962).
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argument which the government has made unsuccessfully in contesting the tax free character of these transfers, insofar as the estate
tax is concerned, is that through the investment power, the settlor
can favor one beneficiary over another and therefore designate the
persons who shall "possess or enjoy the property or income therefrom" within the meaning of 2036(a)(2). The second power that the
settlor of a trust can retain is the power to remove and appoint
trustees other than himself.' A third broad managerial power courts
have left untaxed is the ability to allocate receipts between principal and income.' The fourth, and final, untaxed power a grantor can
exercise is the retention of the privilege of buying from and selling
to the trust.8
A divided Court in Byrum reflected the difficulties of coming
to a decision, difficulties that had troubled the lower courts., In
6. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970). One authority
prior to Byrum had questioned the appropriateness of defining this power as purely administrative at least in some circumstances. Lewis, Powers Retained by the Settlor of a Trust:
Their Income Estate and Gift Tax Treatment, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 15 n.111 (1970),
citing income tax decisions. This author lists two administrative powers in addition to retained voting rights: "the right to choose the trust investments and to allocate receipts and
expenditures between the income and the principal." Id. at 15.
7. Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 114 (1969); Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
8. Estate of Budd v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Ford v. Commissioner,
53 T.C. 114 (1969). These examples that are not taxed by the estate tax may nevertheless be
taxable under the income tax provisions under sections 674 and 675 of the Internal Revenue
Code. For an excellent analysis showing a lack of symmetry among the three codes-estate,
gift, and income, see Lewis, Powers Retained by the Settlor of a Trust: Their Income, Estate
and Gift Tax Treatment, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1970).
9. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion for himself, Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Marshall, Stewart, Rehnquist and Douglas. Justice White, in dissent, was joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. In the district court Judge Kinneary found for Byrum's
estate, largely on the basis of Yeazel v. Coyle, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 1681 (N.D. I1. 1968), in which
the settlor of the trust retained the right to sell and invest corpus, and to vote without
retaining the "possession or enjoyment of or the right to income from the property." 311 F.
Supp. 892 at 894 (1970). In the court of appeals, Byrum v. United States, 440 F.2d 949 at
952 (1971), the majority felt that "[tihe only power retained by the grantor which may
possibly have made the transferred assets includable in his estate was the power to vote the
unlisted shares of the stock." Id. at 952. The majority went on to hold that, unlike the
grantor's powers in United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), the settlor in Byrum did
not retain the right to regulate the income flow. Byrum's powers were indirect; even if he
could have elected the directors, their actions were subject to fiduciary obligations. Chief
Justice Phillips dissented from the majority:
In addition to reserving the right to vote the stock, he retained the power to veto
any sale of the stock by the trustee and the right to remove the trustee and appoint a
new trustee.
It is not determinative . . . that anyone of these retained rights, standing alone
in a different factual situation, might not have subjected the stock to the federal estate
tax as a part of the taxable estate of the decedent. I would hold that the retained
powers in the aggregate . . . operated to reserve to the settlor the enjoyment of the
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Byrum, the settlor, Milliken C. Byrum, transferred to an irrevocable, inter vivos trust a substantial portion of his stock in three small
corporations. In each of these corporations, he was the principal
owner. His control of these corporations consisted, in the formal
sense, of his ownership at the time of the transfer of at least 71% of
the outstanding stock of each. In the trust agreement, Byrum gave
to the trustee broad powers to manage and control the assets of the
trust, all for the benefit of Byrum's children or their issue. The
trustee, for example, could sell property and invest the proceeds
without "any limitation whatsoever as to the character of investment under any statute or rule of law."'" In addition, the trustee
could make leases, apportion receipts between principal and income
and exercise broad discretionary powers to apply income and principal for the "education, care, maintenance and support"" of the
beneficiaries of the trust until the trust terminated when the beneficiaries reached the age of 35. Notwithstanding the transfer of all of
these powers to the trustee, Byrum, by language in the trust agreement, kept four powers: (1) to vote the shares of unlisted stock held
in the trust estate; (2) to disapprove the sale of the stock held by
the trust; (3) to approve investments; and (4) to remove the trustee
and designate another corporate successor.'"
At the time that Byrum died, he owned 59% of the stock in one
corporation and the trust owned 12%, giving him the ability to vote
71%.' 3 In the second corporation, Byrum owned 35% of the stock and
could vote for the trust an additional 48%, resulting in a total voting
power of 83%.'" The figures for the third corporation indicated that
Byrum could vote 88% of the stock. He owned 42% of the stock at
his death and could vote an additional 46% of the stock which was
in the trust.'5 Thus, these figures clearly reflect the important fact
that Byrum had not relinquished voting control in any of the three
corporations. Moreover, he received a salary as an executive of the
corporations.
The opinion of the majority considered both paragraphs of
subsection 2036(a) and first found that Byrum, in passing the stock
shares and the right to designate the persons who would enjoy the income from them
within the meaning of 2036(a)(1) and (2) ...
440 F.2d at 953.
10. 408 U.S. at 127 n.1.
11. Id.
12. 408 U.S. at 127. These administrative powers are the same as are included in those
powers described in text accompanying notes 5, 6, 7 & 8, supra.
13. 408 U.S. at 130 n.2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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to the trust had not, under section 2036(a)(2), retained the power
"to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom."'" The majority further concluded that
Byrum had not, under 2036(a)(1), retained the possession or enjoyment of the property. 7
2.

A Preview of the Amendment

Recently, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress overruled
one aspect of the Byrum case by amending section 2036(a)(1) to
specifically include the retention of voting rights within the meaning of "enjoyment" of such Stock. The entire statute with both sections and the amendment now reads:
(a) GENERAL RULE. The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death(1) The possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. For purposes of paragraph (1), the
retention of voting rights in retained stock shall be considered to be
a retention of the enjoyment of such stock.'"
In writing the amended portion, Congress meant to state
"transferred" stock rather than "retained" stock. "Retained" stock
has long been taxable under section 2033 as property owned by the
decedent at death. We anticipate the early passage by Congress of
a technical amendment to make plain that transferred stock is
taxed ifthe donor retains voting rights.'" Other modifications discussed later in this article have already been introduced in Congress.
The BYRUM Decision: Majority and Dissenting Perspectives
Returning to Byrum and ruminating over the opinions authored
by Justices Powell and White, it becomes clear that the split in the
B.

16.

408 U.S. at 144.

17. Id.
18. I.R.C. § 2036.
19. In Tilman v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 32 (1976), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in a per curiam opinion at footnote 9 noted the error by quoting the amendment: "For
purposes of [Sec. 2036(a)] the retention of voting rights in [transferred] stock shall be
considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of such stock." Id. at 35 n.9.
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Court is attributable to three disagreements: (1) the construction of
section 2036, with its two divisions, 2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2); (2)
the interpretation of case law construing the statutes which preceded section 2036; and (3) the resolution of the question of
whether a majority shareholder of a given corporation has the
capacity to dictate the policy of the corporation. These disagreements occur primarily because the courts have, over the years,
failed to clarify the values they wish to promote in construing the
Internal Revenue Code. Apparently, both the courts and Congress
are unaware of the complexity of the wealth transmission process
which encompasses numerous tax statutes. Irreconcilable views,
scarcely articulated at a policy level, appear in the confines of a
narrow situation, forced on the court, of course, by the one case
before it. The Byrum case is additionally rigid in that its development led the Court to reason within the small categories of the two
sections of 2036, taking each at a time, with the result that an analyst gets the surrealistic impression of a two-time trip down separate lanes of the same highway. Much of the reasoning under 2036
(a)(2),20 which the Court discussed more fully than when it took
up 2036(a)(1), becomes djz vu at the second stage, when the
Court, in turn, takes up the latter provision. For our purposes, it is
useful to follow the government argument under 2036(a)(2), then
to take up the responses of the majority and minority opinion, and
then to repeat the process with 2036(a)(1).
The linchpin of the government's argument under 2036(a)(2)
was that Byrum could vote a majority of the stock of the three
corporations whose shares he had had transferred in trust and, as a
consequence, dictate the dividend policies of the corporations. This
control over dividends resulted from the fact that Byrum's ability
to vote a majority of the stock in each corporation enabled him to
elect a majority of the board of directors. And inasmuch as he could
select persons who could be responsive to his wishes he was assured
a board that would implement a dividend policy he liked. Moreover,
since Byrum retained a power to preclude the trustee from alienating any of the transferred stock, he could assure his continued control over corporate dividends, and thus "regulate the 'flow of income
to the trust' and thereby shift or defer beneficial enjoyment of trust
income between the present beneficiaries and the remaindermen." 2 '
Since the government saw Byrum's power as equivalent to the
20. As the majority points out, the government placed primary reliance on section
2036(a)(2) in arguing for the taxability of the trust. 408 U.S. at 131-32.
21. 408 U.S. at 132.
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power to accumulate income, it argued that the case was controlled
22
by United States v. O'Malley, where the Court had held that the
settlor's designation of himself as one of three trustees of an inter
vivos trust under which the trustees were "authorized . . . to pay
income to the life beneficiary or to accumulate it as part of the
principal of the trust 'in their sole discretion,' " subjected the settlor's estate to tax for the amount of income actually accumulated
3
by the trustees and applied to principal. The minority in O'Malley
had dissented from the majority's conclusion that the transferor had
not transferred the income but only the principal in the trust.
In rejecting the government's argument, Justice Powell, strictly
construing the statute, concluded that the use of the word "right"
in section 2036(a)(2) evinced a congressional intent that only the
reservation of a "right," as opposed to a mere "power," to determine
who shall enjoy the transferred property or resulting income would
trigger the tax.24 As to what specifically constitutes a "right" under
the statute, the Court indicated that the term encompassed powers
which were both "ascertainable and legally enforceable," as was the
power in O'Malley.
Applying that notion of a "right" to the power attributed to
Byrum to regulate the flow of income to the trust by controlling the
corporations' dividends, Justice Powell found that neither the aspect of ascertainability nor that of legal enforceability was present:
"The 'right' [attributed to Byrum] was neither ascertainable nor
legally enforceable and hence was not a right in any normal sense
of that term.""
More specifically, concerning the nonexistence of an ascertainable standard, the Court noted that the "control rationale . .
as to be
would create a standard . . . so vague and amorphous
2 6 and that the
impossible of ascertainment in many instances,"
"concept of 'control' is a nebulous one . . . too variable and imprecise to constitute the basis per se for imposing tax liability under
dissented on a strict reading of
22. 383 U.S. 627 (1966). Justices Stewart and Harlan
wrote the majority opinion
who
White,
Justice
"transfer."
word
the
uses
which
the statute,
derived from the original
were
trust
the
in
increments
income
the
in O'MaUey, concluded that
transfer and the exercise of the power of accumulation.
placed in trust was
23. The question whether the value of the securities originally
408 U.S. at 152.
court.
district
the
subject to tax had been answered in the affirmative by
for his life . . *
retained
have
"must
settlor
the
that
24. That section 2036(a) requires
or enjoy the property or the
(2) the right . . .to designate the persons who shall possess
income therefrom." Id. at 136.
25. Id. at 136-37.
26. Id. at 137 n.10.
27. Id. at 138 n.13.
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2036(a)." 27 In support of this position, the majority pointed out that
even if one assumes that a controlling stockholder can elect a majority of the board of directors, in most states such control would
not
necessarily extend to all corporate transactions.28
While this observation seems to suggest that "control" is a
variable notion to the extent that it may impart different practical
powers from state to state, the majority makes a more telling
observation concerning the imprecise and amorphous quality of control
in the election of directors when it suggests that it is difficult
to
perceive who has it. It is usually taken that an owner of essentially
all of the stock of a corporation controls the corporation in the
sense
of being able to elect a majority of the board of directors. An illustration of this is found in Yeazel v. Coyle.29 It follows that the person
who can vote a majority of stock can elect the majority of the board.
However, Justice Powell's opinion suggests a qualification to
this
proposition. Specifically, recognizing that the capacity to vote
in
excess of 50% of the stock of a corporation will enable the shareholder to elect, a majority of its directors, he adds the phrase
"in
most circumstances." Although he does not set out the circumstances that could prevent a person voting a majority share of stock
from
selecting a majority of the board, a person would not have de
facto
control if in fact these limiting circumstances existed. The determination of control is compounded in Justice Powell's view by a second
consideration, namely, in some circumstances the capacity to
vote
less than 50% of the stock may nonetheless confer the capacity
to
elect a majority of the board and thus to control the corporation.' 0
Here the Court is recognizing, in a truncated fashion, the panoply
of arrangements indicated by thirteen variations of Byrum-type
situations to be discussed later in this article."'
Regarding the nonenforceability of Byrum's power, the major28. "Under most circumstances, a stockholder who has the right
to vote more than 50%
of the voting shares of a corporation 'controls it' in the sense that
he may elect the board of
directors. But such a stockholder would not control, under the
laws of most states, certain
corporate transactions such as mergers and sales of assets." (emphasis
added) Id. at 138-39
n.13. It is somewhat confusing as to how precisely the emphasized
language, which merely
states that control over the directors does not confer upon the
shareholder absolute power,
supports the majority's proposition that the concept of control
is both "variable and imprecise." The less-than-absolute nature of control bears no relation
to the question of whether
or not "control" is an imprecise concept.
29. Yeazel v. Coyle, 21 A.F.T.R. 2d 1681 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
30. Moreover, control-in terms of effective power to elect
the board under normal
circumstances-may exist where there is a right to vote far less
than 50% of the shares. This
will vary with the size of the corporation, the number of shareholders,
and the concentration
(or lack of it) of ownership.
31. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
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ity stressed that Byrum could not legally compel the directors to
carry out whatever wishes he might have regarding the corporate
dividend policy. Whereas the government had urged that O'Malley
had supported its position, Justice Powell found the case consistent
with his analysis of the statute, since in his view the settlor had
32
reserved a "right" covered by the statute. Since the majority had
determined that Byrum had not retained an enforceable "right" to
allocate income, it distinguished his case from O'Malley: "His
[Byrum's] ability to affect, but not control, trust income, was a
qualitatively different power from that of the settlor in O'Malley,
who had a specific and enforceable right to control the income paid
to the beneficiaries. 3 3
The majority found support for its position in Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 4 which recognized that a settlor's retention of
broad powers of management does not necessarily subject an inter
vivos trust to the federal estate tax, and in Estate of King v.
Commissioner,"5 where the settlor's retention of broad managerial
and investment powers was held not to subject the trust to estate
tax under the predecessor statute to 2036(a)(2). Specifically, since
the majority reasoned that the power which Byrum exercised was
essentially the same managerial power retained by the settlors in
Northern Trust and in King, it viewed the cases as precedent in
ruling for the nontaxable nature of Byrum's trust. Justice Powell
also noted that these cases were significant because they justifiably
convinced many draftsmen of trusts to rely on them to provide
safeguards against tax liability. The majority took the view that
set patterns should be changed by the legislature, since it has superior access to factfinding devices and can give taxpayers advance
warning of change.
Having ruled that Byrum's power over corporate dividend policy was not a "right" covered by section 2036(a)(2), the majority,
had it stopped there, would have been susceptible to the criticism
that it had elevated form over substance. If Byrum could have exerted sufficient influence over the directors to affect the dividend
policy, then an opinion based only upon a finding that Byrum's
(1) there the settlor
32. O'Malley was covered precisely by the statute for two reasons:
right expressly
this
(2)
and
instrument;
trust
the
in
forth
had reserved a legal right, set
income and thereby "to
authorized the settlor, "in conjunction" with others, to accumulate
designate" the persons to enjoy it.
33. 408 U.S. at 143.
34. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
35. 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
curiae at 5-10, U.S. v.
36. See Brief of Howard Gilman et al. Executors, as amicus
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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power did not constitute a "right" within the meaning of section
2036(a)(2) would signify a curious possibility. Thus, a settlor,
by
retaining a formal right over the allocation of income between
present beneficiaries and remaindermen, would have his estate subject
to a tax, but a settlor who accomplishes the same control through
indirect means would escape tax. Presumably, in an effort to deflate
such a criticism, the majority argued that a shareholder who is
able
to vote a majority of stock is constrained in his capacity to influence
corporate dividend policy and is controlled in his power to regulate
the flow of income to the trusts.
The Court set forth three specific restraints upon the shareholder's power to influence the manner in which dividends are
set.
First, the economic fortunes of the corporations might have
been
such that there would be no earnings from which to pay
dividends-an eventuality which would unquestionably preempt
the
settlor from exercising control over the flow of income to the
trust.
Second, since the directors would owe fiduciary duties to all
of the
shareholders, a decision regarding dividends which was intended
to
accommodate Byrum's wishes vis-A-vis his trust but which
adversely affected the interests of the corporation would subject
them
to possible derivative suits. Third, Byrum, as a majority
shareholder, was himself subject to a fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholders, the breach of which would provide the latter with a
cause
of action against him. Finally, the majority added that even
if
Byrum could have controlled the flow of income to the trust,
he
would not have had unlimited power over the allocation of
trust
income since it was within the trustee's discretion to pay
out of
accumulated income.
For the minority, Justice White in his opinion answered each
of the arguments of the majority. He first noted that sections
2036(a)(1) and 2 036(a)(2), taken together, should require the
imposition of a tax upon any transfer which is not a complete and
absolute surrender of the donor's interest in the transferred property.
Having adopted the chief contention raised by the government
that,
whether by a "right" or by a "power," a majority shareholder
can
control dividend policy, Justice White appears to have reasoned
that since Byrum could control the manner in which the trust
beneficiaries enjoyed the income from the shares placed in trust by
controlling the flow of dividend income to the trust, his transfer was
not
only covered by the letter of section 2036(a)(2), but also by its spirit,
since the transfer was rendered less than absolute and unequivocal
in nature.
Turning to the majority's analysis, Justice White rejected the
distinction made by the majority between a "right" and a "power."
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss2/3
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He would not limit the definition of the word "right" within section
2036(a)(2) to situations in which the settlor's capacity to designate
is a
who shall enjoy either the trust's principal or income, or both,
within
"right"
term
the
function of the retention. He would define
the statute to include some unenforceable powers which, despite
real
their unenforceability, nonetheless provided the settlor with
mieconomic control over the trust. Thus, the government and the
nority argued for an economic reality test, or as it is sometimes
called, the de facto test. In support of its analysis, the minority
argued that the formalistic interpretation offered by the majority
was inconsistent with the history of the bill and its enactment. The
circumstances of the passage suggested a wider, more comprehento
sive interpretation. Additionally, the dissenting opinion pointed
and
2036(a)(2)
to
statute
the legislative history of the predecessor
was
argued that this earlier law demonstrated that the word "right"
meaning.
intended to have an expansive rather than a constricted
The minority argued that its position concerning section
was
2036(a)(2) and the difference between a "right" and a "power"
case
that
in
tax
a
of
imposition
the
supported by O'Malley in that
did not turn on whether the settlor had retained a "right" to allocate
income, but instead on whether in fact the settlors could determine
who would enjoy the fruits of the trust.
The specific teaching of O'Malley, in Justice White's view, is
trustee
that it established the position "that a .settlor serving as a
between
income
trust
allocate
is barred from retaining the power to
is not constrained by
a life income tenant and remainderman if he
37 The dissent, having
more than general fiduciary requirements."
found that Byrum's capacity to vote in excess of 50% of the stock
did enable him to allocate trust income through regulation of the
flow of income to the trust, reasoned that not holding Byrum's trust
subject to a tax could not be reconciled with O'Malley.
With respect to the Court's argument that Byrum and other
to
prospective settlors may have justifiably relied upon prior cases
not
conclude that trusts established in Byrum-type fashion would
be taxable, Justice White made two responses. First, he dismissed
have
the relevance of such reliance, assuming arguendo it could
past
of
claims
been shown to exist, since it would permit "artful
the
of
understanding to frustrate present rationalization
law. . .. ,,31 Second, Justice White argued that none of the cases
cited by the Court could have been justifiably relied upon by Byrum
37. 408 U.S. at 157.
.28. 408 U.S. at 163.
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as a basis for concluding his trust would avoid taxation. Northern
Trust, on which the majority depended for its reliance doctrine,
was
inapposite because it dealt with a statute which contained
no
counterpart to 2 036(a)(2) and, quoting Cardozo, it was a decision
as "mouldy as the grave from which counsel brought it forth to
face
the light of a new age. '39 The dissent further submitted
that
Northern Trust was based on a "conceptual framework" which
is no
longer valid, since it depended on May v. Heiner,'"now overruled
by Commissioner v. Estate of Church."
Justice White also contended that the lower court opinions that
buttress a reliance, stare decisis theory involved cases in which
the
settlor retained control by naming himself trustee. In those cases
the
settlor-trustee was subject to strict, judicially enforceable, fiduciary
duties to treat the beneficiaries of the trust in accordance
with
standards set forth in the document and in addition in accordance
with general principles of fiduciary law. Such duties, he observed,
could be used by the beneficiaries as a basis to sue the settlortrustee in the event he attempts to utilize his control over the
trust's
investments to produce an allocation of funds between the life
beneficiaries and remaindermen in a manner inconsistent with the
trust
document. Justice White submitted that since Byrum's alleged
control over the trust through the determination of the corporation's
dividend policies arguably provided him with more freedom to
manipulate the flow of income between present beneficiaries and
remaindermen, in that he would not be constrained by the threat
of
being the subject of derivative suits based upon a fiduciary
duty,
Byrum was not entitled to assume that his trust would be controlled
by the settlor-trustee cases.4"
39. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, IN SELECTED WRITINGS
244 (M. Holl ed. 1947).
40. 281 U.S. 238 (1930). In this case a wife had passed property
to an inter vivos trust
and had directed the trustees to pay the income to her husband
for life, then to herself for
life, and then to divide the remainder among her children. The
Court held that the transfer
in trust was not a testamentary transfer and subject to the estate
tax upon the death of the
settlor.
41. 335 U.S. 632 (1949). See Bittker, The Church and Speigel
Cases: Section 811(c) Gets
a New Lease on Life, 58 YALE L.J. 825 (1949); Bittker, Church
and Spiegel: The Legislative
Sequel, 59 YALE L. J. 395 (1950).
42. The dissent finally argued that since at the time Byrum
drafted his trust, State
Street Trust Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 877 (1958), had
been decided holding, in the
district court, that a settlor could not maintain powers of management
of a trust even as a
trustee without assuming tax liability. Byrum was on notice that
the law was uncertain with
respect to a settlor's retention of control over the trust's stock.
In State Street Trust Co. v.
United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959), the court of appeals
affirmed the district court.
It was only years later that State Street was reversed by Old
Colony Trust Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
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The majority, relying upon Commissioner v. Estate of
Holmes, 3 found that the term "enjoyment" as used in section
2036(a)(1) was intended to connote a "substantial present economic
benefit." 4 Justice Powell described the guarantee of future employdeterment as an insubstantial benefit, and viewed the capacity to
be a
to
speculative
too
as
mine whether or not to effect a merger
notwithstandthat
present benefit. His conclusion for the Court was
ing whatever benefit Byrum may have derived from the retention
stock
of voting power, he had not retained the "enjoyment" of such
2036(a)(1).
within the meaning of section
As to what precise benefits fall within the scope of section
2036(a)(1), the Court observed: "The statutory language plainly
trancontemplates retention of an attribute of the property
or a
ferred-such as a right to income, use of the property itself,
"15
power of appointment with respect either to income or principal.
on
failed
argument
Justice Powell also found that the government's
a second statutory ground. He reasoned that in order for a retained
it
benefit to be enjoyed within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1),
had to be a benefit associated with the property transferred.Apparently having read the government's brief as stating that the attribute of the transferred property which Byrum retained and enjoyed
was the element of "control," Justice Powell concluded that Byrum
to
could not have retained the attribute of "control" with respect
the transferredstock inasmuch as he never placed in trust in excess
of 50% of the stock of any of his corporations. Whatever control
Byrum had he kept by owning a majority of the stock or by keeping
enough stock to influence the corporation if added to the voting
rights he retained in the trustee's stock. He did not transfer the
majority of stock.
The majority relied heavily upon case law in arriving at its
of
construction of section 2036(a)(1). In addition to citing Estate
inwas
"enjoyment"
Holmes" for the proposition that the term
the
tended to connote a "substantial present economic benefit,"
47 and cases
majority found in Commissioner v. Estate of Church
dependent upon its meaning, that "enjoyment" had been applied
of
only to situations in which an income interest or lifetime use
on
relied
also
majority
property was retained by the seller. The
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

326 U.S. 480 (1946).
Id. at 486.
408 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
326 U.S. 480 (1946).
335 U.S. 632 (1949).
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Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 4 8 as demonstrative of a case in
which the retention of managerial powers, similar to those
retained
by Byrum, was held not to trigger tax as a "trust, 'intended
to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.' ,4
Finally,
the Court distinguished Estate of Holland v. Commissioner.-"
This
case, upon which the government had relied, held taxable
a trust
in which the settlor had retained inter alia, the right to
vote stock
transferred in trust. The majority based its distinction
on the
grounds that the settlor had also retained a right to income.
The
government in Holland and again in Yeazel v. Coyle"
sought to
move the Court by the array of power in the donor.
As in the case of its consideration of section 2036(a)(2), Justice
Powell rejected the notion that Byrum, as a consequence
of being
able to vote a majority share of stock, could control, without
restraint, the employment policies of the corporations so as
to secure
his own future employment. Restraints would include the
rights of
minority stockholders and the surveillance of the Internal
Revenue
Service.
As with the issue of whether Byrum's trust was taxable
under
section 2036(a)(2), Justice White, relying on Estate of Church
for
the minority, determined that subsections (1) and (2),
viewed together, mandated that a transfer of property constitute an
absolute
surrender of all interests in such property. With respect
to
section
2 036(a)(1),
the minority found that Byrum had retained enjoyment
of the property inasmuch as his continued ability to vote
the transferred shares enabled him to control the corporation
and, in so
doing, to secure for himself a compensated position with
two of the
corporations. In view of this continuing benefit (along with
the right
to regulate the flow of income to the trust), Justice White
concluded: "[T]o me it is thus clear that Byrum's shares
were not
truly, totally, 'absolutely, unequivocally' alienated during
his
life. 52
In addition to his reliance on Estate of Church to arrive
at a
comprehensive reading of both sections of 2036 requiring a
complete
transfer of property, Justice White's reference to the case
under his
discussion of section 2036(a)(1) also included his contention
that
Northern Trust, relied upon in the majority opinion, did
not govern
the case before the Court because in Northern Trust, the
settlor did
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

278 U.S. 339 (1929).
408 U.S. at 146.
1 T.C. 564 (1943).
21 A.F.T.R. 2d 1681 (N.D. IlM.1968). See note 29 supra.
408 U.S. at 153.
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not have the capacity to vote a controlling share of the stock of the
corporation whose stock he had placed in trust.
The Byrum Decision: Philosophical Underpinnings
The foregoing discussion, setting forth the specific reasoning of
the
the majority and dissenting opinions, is useful in identifying
and
Court
the
divides
that
fundamental conceptual disagreement
the legal profession. The majority, in the legal positivist tradition,
decided the case by first engaging in a rigid and formalistic interpretation of statutory language in a manner consistent with the princithat
ples articulated in its previous decisions, and then applied
believes
Court
the
view
this
analysis to the facts before it. Under
that if changes are warranted, they can best be made by a response
of Congress by way of statutory amendment. Such congressionally
taxinitiated change would have the advantage of providing the
payer with advance warning. Under that approach, the determinathe
tion of whether a tax is to be imposed rests primarily upon
then
right,
a
(if
trust
the
over
formal nature of the power retained
nature of
taxed; if a mere power, then no tax) or upon the specific
then a
the enjoyment retained (if a "present substantial benefit,"
no tax is
tax is imposed; if the benefit is of a lesser nature, then
approach
triggered). In assessing the reasons why the formalistic
the Jusof
plurality
a
garnered
embodied in the majority opinion
those
satisfied
only
not
tices, it is fair to assume that the opinion
the
of
formalism
the
on the bench who subscribed to the notion that
code
tax
legal positivist method assured that innovation in the
was
would be initiated by Congress rather than the courts, but also
relucappealing to those of the Justices who, for policy reasons, were
corporaclose
the
affect
tant to impose a tax which would adversely
tion as an institution. Their strongest point is that in a democracy,
tax policy is for Congress to determine. This view reflected, perhaps,
is
on Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Church. Their weakest point
their failure to shape tax policy from goals that Congress reasonably
can be said to hold.
The minority eschewed such emphasis upon a formalistic interthe
pretation of the statute. Instead, with respect to 2036(a)(2),
settlor's
dissent saw as determinative the economic reality of the
relation to the trust. The imposition of tax would turn upon whether
of
the settlor could in actuality control the beneficiaries' enjoyment
de
by
or
right
formal
by
the trust income, whether accomplished
trust
facto control, and not upon the form by which power over the
minority
the
was exercised. And with respect to section 2036(a)(1),
berejected the formal distinction raised by the majority opinion
preferring
tween substantial present benefits and other interests,
C.
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instead to find retained enjoyment wherever there was less than a
total relinquishment of interests in the transferred
property. The
minority approach called for a less rigid application of
the principle
of stare decisis. Thus, looking, for example, to their
treatment of
O'Malley, one finds the minority was willing to extract
from that
decision what it considered to be its central principle,
and then to
apply that principle as controlling to a somewhat
different factual
situation. The majority, conversely, appeared unwilling
to so extrapolate, finding that the difference in factual contexts
rendered
the earlier opinion inapposite to the latter. Two other
major disagreements between the majority and the dissent in
Byrum arise
from the differences in attitude toward the institutions
upon which
the rules operate, the close corporation and the trust.
The two factions of the Court possess fundamentally
different
conceptions of how the institution of the closely held
corporation
operates in actual practice. Specifically, while the minority
viewed
this entity as capable of being dominated by its principal
owner, the
majority found that various legal and economic constraints
prevent
such a one man rule. Just as there was no consensus
with respect
to the workings of the closely-held corporation, so too
there was an
absence of agreement regarding the operation of the
institution of
the trust. Consequently, while Justice White believed
that the trust
document set forth a standard which effectively constrained
the
trustee's capacity to use his investment powers to
allocate income
between the trust's beneficiaries, Justice Powell viewed
the typical
trust document as presenting such a wide range of
discretion as to
the choice of investments as not to impose the kind
of restraint
envisioned by the minority.
The basic conceptual difference found in Byrum between
reliance upon a formalistic analysis of the requirements
of the statute
on the one hand, and emphasis upon the economic reality
or de facto
control exercised by the settlor on the other, is a
tension which
reappears throughout the cases. We now turn to the
exploration of
some of these instances.
D.

The Aftermath of Byrum
All of the tension between form and substance inherent
in
Byrum has continued since that decision and the subsequent
antiByrum amendment. The tension shows a fundamental
conceptual
difference that has appeared in numerous judicial interpretations
of
the code. We turn to several cases, most of which, but
not all, were
decided after Byrum.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss2/3
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53
Estate of Beckwith v. Commissioner, decided by the Tax
Court in 1970, presents variation numbers 9 and 10 noted in the next
4
section of this article.- This case must now be read with the understanding of Byrum and the anti-Byrum amendment. In Beckwith,
the settlor of several irrevocable trusts, transferred to them all of his
stock, which at the time of transfer represented 76% of the shares
of the corporation. Although Beckwith, whom Judge Featherston
described as having a "forceful and dynamic" personality, retained
no voting rights, he was a trustee of several of the trusts that held
stock representing 37% of the outstanding shares. There is little
doubt that the anti-Byrum amendment would apply to these shares,
since the estate tax laws apply to powers which the holder can
5
exercise "with any other person," including an adverse trustee.
Another problem, however, still remains: whether the remaining 39% of the transferred stock that Beckwith in fact voted by
proxies came within the reach of section 2036. Since he received the
voting power after the transfer, the argument could easily be made
that he did not retain a power, but rather later received one. The
Tax Court agreed with Beckwith that he had not retained the possession or enjoyment of the stock he voted by proxy, since he had
parted with it at the time of transfer. The government had urged
enjoyment, "just as
the court to find that the settlor had retained
6 The government advosurely as if the trust had never been made."
cated an economic control test rather than one dependent on legally
enforceable rights. The court defined "possession" as a word that
would require an underlying agreement that the transferees of the
stock would vote as told or give proxies to the transferor. The agreement would not have to be in writing, but the arrangement would
have had to be understood at the outset. The "enjoyment" the
government sought to tax was, in essence, the control of the corporation, not the income from the stock. Had Beckwith retained the
income, the court could well have found an implied agreement." A

53. 55 T.C. 242 (1970).
54. See notes 112-14 infra.
Treas. Reg. section
55. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 246 U.S. 85 (1935);
careful observation that the
20.2036-1(b)*(3) (1976). Professor John H. McCord makes the
or enjoyment, and a disamendment applies to section 2036(a)(1) which goes to possession
with another
conjunction
in
trustee
one
by
tinction could be made that a retained power
but rather of section
2036,
section
of
section
that
of
contemplation
the
within
not
trustee is
however, believe that the
2036(a)(2). See J. McCoRD, supra note 1 at 222. He does not,
WARREN, MCDANIEL & GUTMAN, infra note 88
SURREY,
also
See
drawn.
be
should
distinction
at 358.
56. 55 T.C. at 250.
Cir. 1959). In Estate of
57. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d
that the agreement does
held
court
the
Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963),
Layton: [T]he court is
Judge
district
quoted
Biggs
Judge
Chief
writing.
in
be
to
not have
Published
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strong argument can be made, however, that if the enjoyment of
income raises an inference of a prearrangement, the
control of the
corporation should also raise the same inference. The
task would be
to find substantial control, with or without formally
enforceable
legal rights. The phenonmenon of income shifting
demonstrates
that the receipt of income is not in many situations
an important
element in the control of wealth. Apparently, the courts
are not yet
prepared to see property as an aspect of an underlying
power, unless
the nexus is there in the nature of a legally enforceable
right, such
as, most obviously, the receipt of income.
The Byrum majority answered this proposition concerning
de
facto control by indicating that the control test would
create a standard not specified in the statute, a standard so vague
and amorphous as to be impossible of ascertainment in many instances.
Justice Powell defined the present standard: "The statutory
language
plainly contemplates retention of an attribute of the property
tranferred-such as a right to income, use of the property
itself, or a
power of appointment with respect to either income or
principal.""5
If we add to that test, as a consequence of the anti-Byrum
amendment, "and retained voting rights," we have the
present narrow approach. The statute catches some controls but
not all, with
broad highways available for the ingenious planners
to take a
"coach and four through the
act.""9
In Beckwith, the Tax Court also rejected an argument
that
trustees of the Beckwith trusts were subservient to Beckwith, the
dependent upon him and, if not under orders, at least acting
in concert
with him. The court, however, emphasized that the
trustees were
serious business associates and refused to draw an inference
of a
retained right to control the trust. The court upheld
the principle
that an agreement to control would have been sufficient
to constitute retained enjoyment but failed to find a presumption
of an
agreement based on Beckwith's forceful personality, which
had been
argued in Estate of Skinner."O
The subordinate doctrine adopted by the court in Skinner
could
be extended to the similar phenomenon of family control
present in
Beckwith and in many closely-held corporations. The
person in a
corporation who is the chief moving force,, and who
becomes the
aware that the holding in the case places a heavy burden
upon the estate of a settlor of a
discretionary trust to avoid the inference of secret prearrangements
with the trustee when the
settlor has in fact received an income during his life."
Id. at 520.
58. 408 U.S. at 149.
59. Lindley, L.J., Queen v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies,
61 L.J.R. 6 (Q.B. 1891).
60. 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
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transferor, maintains control, in fact, even though, in form, he has
passed over the stock to others. The control he retains, though not
formal, is observable but difficult to measure in economic terms.
Even if the control is primarily psychological, does it not represent
an "enjoyment" of the property?
Usually these dominant transferors, though denuded of stock
ownership, do have salaries. These salaries may be contested, as in
Gilman v. Commissioner,"'discussed later, and disallowed as legitimate expenses for income tax purposes, but a reasonable salary is
not income derived from ownership of the corporation.
The dilemma, as to whether de facto control of subordinates
should be recognized, surfaced again in the 1972 case of Harris v.
2
There the decedent owned less than 9% of the stock
United States.1
no attempt to dispose of it. The issue was rather
made
and in fact
whether a contract made between him and the company, under
which his widow was to receive death benefits, left him with enough
control, through his ability to make changes, as to constitute a
taxable power. The government had urged that the decedent did
have such control in the form of a section 2033 power. While this
case involved a different section of the code the issue is analogous
to that inherent in section 2036.
The court rejected the government's argument that the decedent had sufficient control to change the contract, in an enforceable
sense, even though he had influence over the other stockholders who
were twelve related persons.
In Byrum, the government vigorously relied on the family3 doctrine and cited as major authority United States v. Sunnen. The
Supreme Court gave little attention to the argument based on
Sunnen, which was an income tax case." If this argument had pre61. 65 T.C. 296 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. 29 A.F.T.R. 2d 1558 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
63. 333 U.S. 592 (1947). See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari; United States v. Byrum,
408 U.S. 125 (1972).
which he
64. In Sunnen, the taxpayer entered into an agreement with a corporation of
and his
taxpayer
the
Moreover,
10%.
owned
wife
his
owned 89% of the stock and of which
action.
wife were two of the five directors. Three directors had to agree in order to take binding
to his
assigned
he
which
patents,
on
royalties
received
taxpayer
Under the agreement, the
retained,
wife, who received the income as her own. The court found that the taxpayer had
through cancellation provisions in his agreement with the company and by his relationship
the assignwith his assignee, his wife, "the substance of all the right which he had prior to
rights.
contract
subsisting
were
there
course,
of
Sunnen,
In
610.
at
U.S.
333
ments."
The Supreme Court in Byrum did not answer the government's brief except with footnote
14:
In advocating this de facto approach, the Government relies on our opinion in
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). Sunnen was a personal income tax case
The
in which the Court found the taxpayer had made an assignment of income.
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vailed, a barrier would have fallen to permit the gathering together
and coherent arrangement of similar sections throughout the estate,
gift, and income tax codes. The brief was a brilliant long shot, but
lost.
In line with Beckwith and relying on it, the Tax Court stated
in 1971, in Estate of Barlow,5 that section 2036(a)(1) applies:
only where the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from the property is "retained" at the time the transfer is made. It
does not apply where arrangements, not previously contemplated, are
made after a transfer has been completed to permit the transferor to
enjoy the benefits of the property.6
In Barlow, parents gave a farm to their children and then rented it
back at a fair rental value. The court rejected the argument of the
government that the parents had retained a life estate, since the
parents regained possession by a separate transaction, at a later
date than that of their gift to the children. The key point is that the
parents paid a fair rental value for the lease, which changed the preexisting economic situation. It could have been otherwise if the
rentals had been a sham or if the lease had been for less than the
fair market value as in Dupont v. Commissioner."6 Recently, the Tax
Court in Estate of Green,6 has reaffirmed the position that the court
of appeals had taken in McNichol,69 that the court could imply an
agreement to retain the life estate in the situation where the donor
does in fact receive, later on, a life income. The easy distinction in
the alleged powers in these cases and the retained power in
Beckwith is that the receipt of income has always been considered
a receipt of property; in connection with other rights or powers, the
courts have been reluctant to give them a "property" definition.
In 1976, after Byrum and after the anti-Byrum amendment, the
reasoning relied on the de facto power of a controlling shareholder to regulate
corporate
business for his personal objectives. This case is an estate tax case, not an income
tax
case. Moreover, unlike assignment-of-income cases, in which the issue is who
has the
power over income, this case concerns a statute written in terms of the "right"
to
designate the recipient of income. The use of the term "right" implies that
restraints
on the exercise of power are to be recognized and that such restraints deprive
the
person exercising the power of a "right" to do so.

408 U.S. at 139.

The problem of substantial economic interest as distinct from legal title or control
needs
to always view the underlying meaning of United States v. Grace, 395 U.S.
316 (1969).
65. 55 T.C. 666 (1971).
66. Id. at 670.
67. 63 T.C. 746 (1975).
68. 64 T.C. 1049 (1975).
69. 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959). See also Estate of Skinner, 316 F.2d 517 (3d
Cir. 1963).
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70
Court of Claims had before it Estate of Tully v. United States.
This case raised a question under both sections 2038 and 2033 regarding whether a death benefit that a company paid to the widow
of the deceased should have been included in his gross estate. Tully
is important here only insofar as it discusses Byrum and indicates
a view of the Court of Claims about section 2036.71 Edward A. Tully,
Sr., the decedent, had owned 50% of a corporation; one other person
had owned the other half. In this sense, the case represents an
example of variations 9 and 10 set forth in the next section except
72
that rather than a transfer of stock in trust, there is a contract.
Tully and the other stockholder were principal officers and they
entered into a contract under which the company agreed to pay
death benefits to their widows. Upon Tully's death, the company
paid to his widow $104,000, which the government sought to include
inhis gross estate.
The government construed the employment contract, under
which the widow obtained her benefits, as either (1) leaving Tully
with the right "to alter, amend, revoke or terminate" the interest,
thereby bringing the transaction within 2038(a)(1); or else (2) that
Tully at his death still had an interest in the benefits under the
contract, bringing the transaction within section 2033. The argument in favor of including the benefits in the estate was essentially
that Tully, as a major officer and stockholder, could have convinced
the other stockholder to go along with him to make amendments in
the contract confining rates. The contract, in effect, was an assignment, or gift, of a part of Tully's future earnings; the government
felt that Tully had in fact possessed the power to amend the terms
of the agreement, or the de facto control argument.
The court found that Tully's chance of persuading the other
50% stockholder was speculative and that a section 2038(a) (1) power
applies only to powers that are "demonstrable, real, apparent, and
evident."" The court further held the possibility too vague that
70. 528 F.2d 1401 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
2035, 2037
71. The Tully case today would have to be reviewed with reference to sections
States,
United
v.
Kramer
of
Estate
See
2033.
section
and 2042, as well as section 2036 and
(C.D. Cal. 1972).
406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Hinze v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R. 2d 1553
from
Especially note the amendment to section 2039(c) to remove lump sum distributions
the exclusion. See also I.R.C. § 402(e)(4).
72: See text accompanying footnotes 112-14 infra.
2d 1558
73. 528 F.2d at 1404. The court relies on Harris v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.
the
against
found
Harris
in
court
The
widow.
a
to
annuity
an
involving
(C.D. Cal. 1972)
evidence
was
there
but
stock,
outstanding
government. The decedent owned only 8.85% of the
States, 29 A.F.T.R.
of family control. Similarly, the court in Tully relied on Hinze v. United
2d 1553 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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Tully might have divorced his wife, married another, and thereby
changed the person who would have been the beneficiary. The court
rather summarily dismissed the arguments by the government
under section 2033 based on the court's understanding that section
2038 discussed a "power," section 2033, an "interest." The key
to
section 2033 is whether the decedent retained an enforceable contract right in favor of himself. The court thought of an "interest"
as an economic benefit, a property right, and that Tully had transferred these interests to his wife, and that "he could not reach them
for his own use."74 The court concluded that the associations that
Tully had with the retirement plan were de minimis.11
It is worth stressing the court's view of Byrum as set out in an
important footnote:
In effect, [the government] asks us to hold that corporate control constitutes a section 2038(a)(1) "power." In [Byrum] . . . the
Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that the corporate control could provide a section 2036 right to alter beneficial
enjoyment of trusts. The court specifically noted the vagaries and
uncertainty which a corporate control test would produce in the estate tax area ....
Since we find that Tully did not have control of the corporation,
we need not reach the equally complex question of whether corporate
control might give rise to a section 2038(a)(1) "power. ' 76
In limiting the corporate control test in Tully, the Court of
Claims rejected the test that Judge Philips had urged in the court
of appeals in Byrum and that has been essentially rejected all along
the way, unless O'Malley can still be given that reading. The decision emphasized and endorsed the opinion of the court in Byrum.
. A year after Tully, the Court of Claims, in Estate of Farrel v.
United States, 77 discussed the precise situation in which a testator
had, at least implicity, retained in the trust instrument the right
to
appoint herself or others as a trustee should a vacancy occur. She
twice appointed other persons to fill vacancies and under the state
law, whether she knew it or not, she did retain the power to appoint
herself as a trustee. Acting in the capacity of trustee, she would have
74. 528 F.2d at 1406. See Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d
1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975),
where the court found no enforceable contract.
75. If a court is going to take a strictly formal approach, it might
as well go all the way
as in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949). Rev.
Rul. 70-304 1970-1 C.B.
163 indicates that the commissioner is abandoning his attempt to tax
employee death benefits
under section 2033 and is proceeding entirely under section 2038(a)(1).
76. 528 F.2d at 1404 n.8.
77. 553 F.2d 637 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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had the power to choose the payments of income and principal
among a group of beneficiaries, as well as to vary the times at which
the beneficiaries would receive their final payments. The power was
nevertheless contingent on a vacancy among the trustees, a somewhat more restricted situation than that in Byrum. The court held
that this contingent power was taxable under 2036(a)(2). There is
evidence that the decision is a harsh one, since the trust instrument
did not expressly give the settlor the right to appoint herself and
since she may never have thought that she had such a right.
The decision also upheld the reading of Regulation 20.20381(b), in which the Commissioner accepted the reasoning that some
contingent powers are not affected by 2038 if the decedent could not
have exercised them at death. In Farrel, the decedent could not, at
the time of her death, have changed the beneficiaries of the trust,
since at that time no trustee vacancy existed. Thus, they found no
section 2038 "power." However, the same power was sufficient to
constitute a taxable power under 2036(a), since twice7 8 during the
decedent's life she could have filled an existing vacancy. This game
of identifying the effective taxing provision is one of the sources of
confusion in the tax code.
The Farrel court, in the majority opinion, stressed that the
settlor's contingent right to designate herself a trustee, although not
expressly stated in the agreement, was unlike the de facto powers
in Byrum and Tully. The court found, instead, a formal, legally
enforceable right, that Mrs. Farrel could have exercised. In concurring, Judge Kunzig distinguished his view of Farrelfrom the unanimous opinion of the court which he wrote in Tully, by application
of the phrase "demonstrable, real, apparent, and evident." He characterized the interest retained in Farrelas real. The subtle distinction found by Judge Kunzig between Tully and Farrelcould become
increasingly significant if efforts continue to establish economic
reality as the test of what constitutes a taxable power under section
2036. This view might facilitate the solution of the puzzle as to
the Treas78. The opinion states: "it is not unreasonable to regard 2036(a), in the way
has at
ury does, as a blanket overall sweeping-in of property over which the decedent still
possession
have
shall
who
those
choose
to
power
contingent,
death some significant, though
the
or enjoyment." Id. at 642. In LOWNDES, KRAMER, & McCoaD, supra note 1 at 719-20,
under
powers
contingent
of
non-taxability
the
conceding
by
that
note
authors interestingly
..
section 2038 unless the contingency has occurred at the settlor's death, "the symmetry.
also HeckerSee
2037.
or
2036
sections
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same
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to
seeking
by
is marred"
REAL. PROP.,
ling, Tax Aspects of Power to Remove, Substitute and Appoint Trustees, 8
impunity to appoint
with
grantor
a
permit
does
77-182
Rul.
Rev.
(1973).
545
J.
TR.
AND
PROB.
inasmuch as the grantor
a successor trustee if the trustee is restricted to a corporate trustee
in this situation cannot appoint himself as trustee.
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which clusters of human energies are characterized as
"enforceable," although in reality they are unimportant,
and which
are characterized as "nonenforceable," but practically speaking,
constitute substantial de facto powers.
Gilman v. Commissioner,"9 decided before Tully and Farrel,is
the most important case to arise since Byrum. In Gilman, the government sought unsuccessfully to distinguish the two cases. In
Gilman, the decedent Charles had owned six shares of common
stock which represented 60% of the voting stock in a large family
corporation. His four sisters each owned one share. The stock structure of the corporation also included 25,000 shares of preferred nonvoting stock, of which, in 1944, the company owned 15,099 shares.
Charles owned 5,241 shares, and his four sisters each owned 1,140
shares. Charles, since his father's death, had been the chief executive officer. In an effort to get control of the company, Charles,
among other acts, placed his six shares in an irrevocable trust of
which he was one of three trustees, along with his son and his lawyer. Under the trust instruments all decisions were to be made by
majority vote, and the income of the trust was payable to Charles'
two sons for life, with remainders to their issue. The effect of this
arrangement was that Charles had no reversion in the principal,
received no income, and retained no powers, including the right to
vote the stock, all of which had individually constituted
"enjoyment" of stock, in prior decisions, under
2036(a)(1).10 The
trustees, including Charles, voting by majority, could vote the stock
in corporate matters, but since Gilman was decided before the antiByrum amendment, the tax court could rule for the estate, in reliance on Byrum, where the taxpayer's power to vote the stock alone
was not found to trigger the tax. The court of appeals, affirming the
lower court's decision, added: "Indeed, the facts of Charles Gilman's trust actually add strength to the taxpayer's case, for here the
decedent's authority over the trust was . . . formally limited by the
existence of the two co-trustees." '81
The Tax Court noted that section 2 036(a)(2) requires a "right,"
which according to Byrum "connotes an ascertainable and legally
79. 65 T.C. 296 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 547 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1976).
The case reached
the court of appeals after the anti-Byrum amendment which, however,
did not apply to his
earlier case.
80. Charles retained the right to appoint successor trustees; the trustees
"were given
broad management and investment powers, including 'full power
and authority to grant,
bargain, sell, assign, transfer, and convey all or part of the trust estate.'
Included among these
management powers was the right to vote the stock held in trust."
65 T.C. at 300.
81. 547 F.2d at 35.
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enforceable power." 2 The Tax Court found that all powers that
might have been ascribed to Charles were fiduciary.
As with Byrum, this case, today, would be moot because of the
anti-Byrum amendment. Suppose, however, that Charles had not
been a trustee. It is in this respect that the case is significant. The
tax court divided, with four judges dissenting, and the tone of the
several opinions shows the seriousness of the different approaches
to these matters, even after Byrum.
Judge Raum's dissenting opinion, with which Judges Simpson
and Wilbur agreed, describes a family situation of turmoil and friction and quotes Charles as having said to his father that "I wanted
first and uppermost to be put in a position where I would run the
company, because I felt I was the only one that could run the com5' 3
pany. When I say 'run it,' have control of it." To get control, Judge
Raum argued, Charles obtained the six shares of stock, two from an
option he had obtained from his father, and four he had acquired
earlier. He thus "enjoyed" the control of the corporation. The judge
felt that retention of control was implicitly understood or even actually agreed upon. The judge did not find the testimony of Charles'
attorney credible regarding the fact that no such understanding
existed. Impressed by, this evaluation of the evidence, Judge Tannewald also wrote a dissent, which Judge Wilbur joined, stressing that
the court should have upheld the trier of fact, Judge Raum, who
found that there was an understanding between the settlor and the
trustees that secured to the settlor the "enjoyment" of property
within the meaning of 2036(a)(1). Certainly one can derive from
Judge Tannewald's view support for establishing a presumption of
a plan where stock is transferred in a situation in which the reten84
tion of control of the corporation may be logically inferred.
The majority, in rejecting the existence of a pre-existing plan,
stressed that when Charles set up the trust in 1948, the other stockholders (his sisters) had no inclination to sell their shares. It was
only in 1957, following the corporation's redemption of shares, that
Charles was freed from the constraint of potential opposition from
82. 65 T.C. at 316.
83. 65 T.C. 319. Judge Tannewald's opinion clearly expresses a hope that Byrum will
not be "mandated into a rigid doctrine." 65 T.C. at 323. In a curious, undeveloped portion
of his opinion, he attempts to limit Gilman by calling it sui generis, apparently for the reason
that the only real value of the trusteed stock was the vote-the control. 65 T.C. at 323-24.
84. The majority took into account Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1(a)(ii) (1976) which provides:
"an interest or right is treated as having been retained or reserved if at the time of the transfer
there was an understanding, expressed, or implied, that the interest or right would later be
conferred." 65 T.C. at 307 n.4. The court also cited Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
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a significant minority of unrelated stockholders to actions by the
trustees, taken on the basis of an underlying agreement. Although
his sisters were of course related, they were hostile. Since the majority discussed this question of pre-existing arrangement, although it
did not find that one existed, it may be possible that in a different
fact situation they might apply the doctrine of corporate control.85
And the fact that the decision was a close one indicates that this
view may be gaining support. The tone of the majority, however,
does not support the corporate-control test to judge one or more
legally enforceable powers. The majority fully agrees with the majority opinion in Byrum.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Goffe, joined by two other
judges, found the fact situation squarely within Byrum and added
that the exercise of fiduciary powers could not be equated with
enjoyment. Certainly Gilman must be taken as a strong affirmation
of Byrum, if not, indeed, an extension. Other cases clearly uphold
the theme of Byrum and do not draw distinctions that might limit
it.8

The importance of Gilman lies not so much in whether it can
properly be distinguished from Byrum; rather, its chief significance
lies in its indication, albeit sub silentio, of the great tax savings that
accrue to a taxpayer under selected forms of stock recapitalization.
The familiar form, used widely both before and after Byrum, is that
of the preferred stock capitalization plan. Under it, the principal
owner of a family, closely-held corporation creates in the recapitalization process two classes of stock. He then retains sufficient preferred stock (with specially created voting rights) to allow him to
keep control of the business. He further sets a low income level, as
with limited dividends, to the class of preferred voting stock and
then transfers the common stock to beneficiaries at a low gift tax
rate, or optimally at no gift tax at all. The features of this plan, with
their difficulties and choices, are discussed in several recent articles
of high order. 7 The preferred stock plan is not identical with the
85.

Estate of Goodwyn v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 740 (1973); Estate of Chalmers v.

Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 792 (1972).

86. Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 170-77 (1977); Burch & Hemmerling, Estate Planning
in
an Inflation Economy, 27 U.S.C. TAX INST. 489 (1975); Moore, Byrum Revisited, 27 U.S.C.
TAX INST. 489 (1975); Pressment, Effect of Tax Court's Gilman Decision on
Estate Planning
for the Close Corporation, 44 J. TAX 160 (1976).
87. The matter of motive in connection with transfers under section 2036 requires
a
study of the implications of United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969) which arose under
the predecessor statute section 811(c)(1)(B), 1939 Code. Although the intent may
not be
determinative of fair taxability if the economic realities require it, the intent does indicate
the existence and purpose of a prearranged plan.
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plan in Gilman, which today would have the defective feature of the
retention of an ability to vote the stock. The two are similar in their
purpose, which is to keep control in the hands of the transferor, not
all the control, but some control, a control that is observable, the
desire for which motivated the arrangements, and a control that
should be subject to a future estate tax.
E.

The 1976 Amendment and BYRUM

The amendment to section 2036(a)(1) has not, however, eliminated other problems raised in the Byrum decision, although today
the stock that Byrum transferred would be taxed as a part of his
88
estate. Congress apparently agreed with numerous commentators,
without making it clear what theory it wished the courts to follow,
that Byrum had retained de facto control of the corporation, or at
least a present interest in the corporation, that exceeded his own
retained shares. Congress did make it clear that it would now tax
all stock transfers with retained voting rights. The result is that the
tax now applies to the transfer of small amounts of stock in large
corporations, transfers that do not in any functional way affect the
control of the corporation, as well as to significant transfers of stock
as in Byrum, i.e., transfers that define control of closely-held corporations. In order to eliminate the overbroad reach of the amendment, however, Congress now appears to be moving towards the
government's position of taxing only substantial transfers which
affect control.
Although the issue raised concerning retained voting rights is
now settled, a disinterested observer may still see in the Byrum
situation an interesting and instructive flow of events that, if analyzed, can be of use in solving both short-term and long-term problems inherent in the transfer of wealth. These arrangements typify
efforts on the part of successful businessmen and women to pass on
their wealth to their families and successors, and, at the same time,
maintain control over the family corporation. The drama is classical. As Cardozo expressed it: "Seldom do the living mean to forego
88. In SURREY, WARREN, McDANIEL & GUTmAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION
295 (1977), the authors state: "By resorting to the most strained legalisms and by adopting a
singularly unrealistic view of the operation of closely held corporations, the majority blessed
this tax avoidance scheme." In LOWNDES, KRAMER & McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT
TAXES 217 (1974), the authors state: "The reasoning of the court in Byrum is not entirely
satisfactory." Note, 50 DEN. L.J. 227 (1973). Professor Alice A. Soled has given a thorough
analysis of the problem prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Byrum in Soled, Estate Tax
Consequences of Inter vivos Transfers of Stock in a Closely Held Corporation,31 MARYAND
L. REV. 191 (1971). A provocative brief analysis is available in STEPHENS, MAXFIELD & LIND,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 4-88 (1974).
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the power of disposition. . .. ",8 Memories of King Lear are real; or
as both Professors Thomas Shaffer and George Cooper have quoted
Sartre, "I am what I own." 90
Today, owners such as Byrum cannot, since the anti-Byrum
amendment and the new uniform credit,9 ' get the same tax advantages they could have obtained a few years ago if they had employed the same method. They can, however, still approximate,
under Byrum rules, the same idea; they can avoid some taxes and
keep some control, a modified version of the "heads, I win; tails, you
lose" exercise. Property owners may still obtain four advantages by
making early gifts, even though the new unified credit eliminates
the former principal advantage of transfers before death, i.e., that
the estate tax was 25% higher than the gift tax. 2
The first of the four remaining advantages that donors may
enjoy by making inter vivos gifts is that of the annual exclusion still
allowable under section 2503.11 This $3,000 exclusion, $6,000 for
married persons,9 4 is still important to careful planners. 5 It is entirely possible, by annual giving over a long period of time, to pass
on large sums of money, especially in the form of insurance and
stocks. Specifically, the courts are presently permitting a majority
89. Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 313, 122 N.E. 221, 223 (1919).
90. T. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAWYERS 8 (1970); Cooper, supra note 2.
91. The theme of the new uniform tax seeks to combine, at the same rates, all taxable
transfers. It introduces a generous uniform credit, and the single transfer tax that considerably lessens the burden of the middle class. The middle class is benefited in that now a person's
estate will not be subject to any federal transfer tax at all if, for example, the person is single
and transfers less than $175,625; and, if married, transfers less than $425,625. These figures
are those that will apply in 1981, after a phase-out period and which take into account the
full use of the marital deduction ($175,625 as an exclusion, plus $250,000 marital deduction,
gives $425,625). The upper reach of the tax is now 70% rather than 77% and if the transfers
are all made at the death of the transferor, the tax is lower under the new law for the rich as
well as for the well-to-do. The gift taxes, however, are now higher, so that the very rich, at
least, who used to depend on the 25% difference between the gift tax rate and the estate tax
rate, will now have to pay somewhat more for transfers, unless they use the methods of tax
avoidance or make tax deductible gifts to charities. Congress is assuming, and probably
rightly so, that the middle class had never taken much advantage of the cheaper gift tax rates.
92. Although the Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduces a generation skipping tax that
could have a far reach, the present significance of the reform goes to the rate of tax rather
than to the type of transfers that are taxed. Even though all gifts and testamentary transfers
may be seen as one taxable process, estate planners must still work within the basic provisions
of the gift tax provisions on the one hand and the estate tax provisions on the other.
93. I.R.C. § 2503.
94. If the split gift election is made under I.R.C. § 2513.
95. Indeed if it were going to grant an exclusion at all, it is rather odd that Congress
left the amount at $3,000, since the new unified credit takes into account inflationary tendencies in middle size estates. The $3,000 figure has remained constant since 1943, and earlier it
had been higher.
96. See Cooper, supra note 2 at 191-95. If gifts are made to minors this problem requires
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stockholder to pass on to his beneficiaries minority stock rights, so
long as he does not retain the voting rights of the stock which is
transferred. If he continues to hold a majority of the stock himself,
he does not need the votes of his beneficiaries. In these situations
donors continue to control dividend decisions through their power
over retained stock and, as a consequence of the retained power,
allow future dividends to pass to their donees as wealth taxable to
these donees, usually at lower rates. There are difficulties with this
maneuver if the donors seek to get the $3000 annual exclusion on
7
stock in corporations that have not paid dividends for years.
In addition to the $3,000 annual exclusion, there is a second
reason which makes it advantageous for donors to give away property rather than have it pass at death, despite the payment of tax
at the time of the gift. This second advantage is based on the traditional preference for inter vivos giving and is derived from the new
code provision, section 2001(b) (2)." The benefit is that payment of
gift taxes will reduce an estate by the amount of the gift taxes paid.
Moreover, this amount would have been taxed at a presumably
higher marginal estate tax rate at death." This advantage does not
apply to gifts made within three years of death, even though these
gifts made late in life, formerly called gifts in contemplation of
death, are still granted the $3,000 exclusion. In addition, the gift tax
00
paid by the decedent on any gift made within three years of death'
is included in the gross estate; this is referred to as "grossing up"
the gift tax.
The third advantage of inter vivos giving is that it reduces the
marginal tax base of the donor for income tax purposes. A good
example is that of a donor in a fifty percent income tax bracket.
Future dividends will escape the higher income tax rate of the
donor. In these cases, the spreading of the income is favorable to
both donors and donees, and unfavorable to the government.
careful study of section 2503(c) and the lessons of Crummy v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th
Cir. 1968). See LOWNDES, KRAMER & MCCORD, supra note 1 at 823-38.
97. Stark v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 1263, 30 A.F.T.R.2d 5876 (W.D. Mo. 1972),
aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 131, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d 1457 (8th Cir. 1973). Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-344, 19691 C.B. 225, disallowing the annual deduction of trusteed stock, the income from which,
though payable to a beneficiary may be invested in non-income producing property and life
insurance.
98. I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2).
99. See J. MCCORD, supra note 1 at 28; Cooper, supra note 2, at 171. A disadvantage of
the early inter vivos gift is that the donor must then pay the tax. This hardship may be
compensated for by the passing on of future earnings to a donee with a lower tax base.
100. I.R.C. § 2035, if the wife has joined in, her half portion of the tax is not "grossed
up." I.R.C. § 2513.
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A fourth advantage that donors may achieve through inter
vivos gifts, though somewhat more speculative than the other advantages, is avoidance of estate tax on future profits. Because future
income (interest, dividends, rent, and similar items) is paid to the
donee, any of such income which the donee retains until the donor
dies (or the value of any property which the donee purchases with
such income) will not be included in the donor's estate tax base.','
Also, any appreciation in value of the gifted property between the
date of gift and the date of the donor's death will not be included
in the donor's estate tax base. '
A fifth advantage of inter vivos giving is the ability to shift to
the donee the income tax burden of any appreciation between the
donor's purchase cost and the fair market value at the time of gift.' 3
If these remaining advantages of early giving are important to
a donor, he may need to consider the impact of Byrum and its
probable effect on future court decisions. Other persons, seeking
changes in tax policies and decisions, should also be concerned with
the aftermath of Byrum. It is helpful for both potential donors and
tax reformers to understand at least thirteen variations on the
theme of stock transfers in a closely-held corporation. Appreciation
of the complexity of this subject will help explain the growing confusion in the doctrines and decisions throughout the entire wealth
transmission process. These variations show decidedly that donors
keep varying amounts of control while passing on other rights and
powers. The pragmatic question is where to draw the line for the
taxfree transfers, tax free in the sense of avoiding the estate tax,
although the transferor may, of course, still have to pay a gift tax.
Specifically, then, the variations are:
1. X, owning a majority interest in a company, transfers in trust
a minority interest with retained voting power and keeps a majority
interest. This was one of two situations in Byrum.'04
2. X, owning a majority interest in a company divides that
interest and transfers in trust a minority interest with retained vot101. This rule applies even when the donor dies within three years of the date of gift.
J. MERTENS, 3 LAW OF FEDERAL GiFr & ESTATE TAXATION § 22.80 (Rev. ed. 1973 & Cum. Supp.
1977).
102. The date of gift value will be included in the estate tax base as "adjusted taxable
gifts," under section 2001(b)(B), but the date of death value will not be considered for estate
tax purposes (unless of course the donor dies within three years of making the gift, in which
case the date of death value is used to compute the donor's gross estate. I.R.C. § 2035(a)).
103. Section 1015(a) establishes that the donee's basis for determining gain upon later
disposition is the donor's adjusted basis at the time of gift, increased by the donor's gift tax
paid in accordance with section 1015(d).
104. See H.R. No. 94-1180, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (August 2, 1976).
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313.

ing power and keeps a minority interest. This was the second of the
two situations in Byrum.
3. X, owning a majority interest in a company, transfers in trust
a majority interest with retained voting power and retains a
minority interest.'"5
4. X, owning a majority interest in a company, transfers in trust
his entire interest, retaining voting power over all or a majority
share of the stock transferred.
5. X, owning a majority interest in a company, transfers in trust
his entire interest, retaining voting power over a minority share of
the stock transferred.
6. X, owning a minority interest in a company, transfers in trust
a minority interest, retaining voting power over all or a portion of
the stock. 06
7. X, owning a minority interest in a company transfers his
entire interest, retaining voting power.
An important distinction between variations 3 and 4 on the one
hand, and 5, 6, and 7 on the other goes to the certainty of whether
the settlor exercises de facto control over the corporation following
his creation of the trust. With respect to 3 and 4, observers can well
assume that the settlor, by virtue of controlling a majority interest,
will be able to elect a majority of the board of directors, and to that
extent control the corporation. Regarding 5, 6, and 7, however, the
question of whether the settlor controls the corporation is more
problematical. While in many instances a minority share of stock
will be sufficiently small to prevent the settlor from electing a majority of the board, in other situations, as pointed out in the majority
opinion in Byrum, a minority interest may confer such electoral
power on the settlor.17 Because a mere tallying of the votes at the
105. This factual pattern did not occur in Byrum but Justice Powell referred to it, if at
all apposite, as relevant only to section 2036(a)(1) and not to section 2036(a)(2), 408 U.S. at
148-49.
106. The anti-Byrum amendment would now tax this transfer, as well as variation
seven, under the estate tax. But as an original proposition the government was willing to
concede its nontaxability because of its unimportant minority characteristic. Id. at 137 n.10.
This type of transfer would not become unimportant if it reflected de facto control. See
especially variations 9, 10, & 11.
107. The Government uses the terms "control" and "controlling stockholder" as
if they were words of art with a fixed and ascertainable meaning. In fact, the concept
of "control" is a nebulous one. Although in this case Byrum possessed "voting control"
of the three corporations (in view of his being able to vote more than 50% of the stock
in each), the concept is too variable and imprecise to constitute the basis per se for
imposing tax liability under § 2036(a). Under most circumstances,a stockholder who
has the right to vote more than 50% of the voting shares of a corporation "controls it"
in the sense that he may elect the board of directors. But such a stockholder would
not control, under the laws of most States, certain corporate transactions such as
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settlor's disposal will not in every instance reveal the existence of
the settlor's control over a corporation, judges may wish to evaluate
not only the percentage of stock in a corporation that the settlor
possesses, or over which he retains voting rights, but also the settlor's retention of administrative and managerial powers, and even
the settlor's dominant psychological, intellectual, and economic
position in the corporation.'0 8 If, as in Byrum, the settlor not only
retains the right to vote the shares but also reserves the power to
prevent the trustee from selling the stock, then a disinterested observer might conclude that the settlor did own a controlling interest
in the corporation. The theory behind attributing control to the
settlor in such an instance stems from a likely motivation of the
settlor-that of maintaining the benefits which accrue to a controlling block of stock by tying the hands of the trustee. This view is
consistent with the following observation made by Justice White in
his dissent in Byrum: "He [Byrum] obviously valued control because he forbade the bank that served as trustee to sell the trust
shares in these corporations without his-Byrum's approval, whatever their return, their prospects, their value, or the trust's
needs." 09
Following the 1976 amendments, which are applicable to gifts
made and to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1976, it
is clear that all of the transfers in variations 1-7 would be taxed. A
proposed amendment would tax only stock transfers with retained
voting rights in situations where the decedent and his relatives own
as much as 20% of a closely-held corporation. Thus, the taxability
vel non of variations 6 and 7 would depend upon the size of the
minority interest.
The Code as interpreted would still seek to tax only formally
retained voting rights rather than de facto control." '0 The government in all these variations has consistently focused on de facto
economic control and has been willing to waive taxation on minor
mergers and sales of assets. Moreover, control-in terms of effective power to elect the
board under normal circumstances-may exist where there is a right to vote far less
than 50% of the shares. This will vary with the size of the corporation, the number of
shareholders, and the concentration (or lack of it) of ownership.
Id. at 138-39 n.13 (emphasis added).
108. See Macdonald, The Wealth Tax-The Wrong Tool for the Job, 1975 BRiTISH TAX
REV. 283. The best systematic development for understanding the relationships affected by
wealth transmission is Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
109. 408 U.S. at 155.
110. See, e.g., the discussion of Estate of Hilton W. Goodwyn, note 112, infra.
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transfers, although formal, because minor voting rights do not affect
the government objective which is the taxation of economic control.
We continue with the variations:
8. X transfers stock in trust in accordance with any one of the
preceding variations, but retains no voting rights. Instead, X names
himself either as sole trustee or as one of several trustees.",
9. X transfers stock in trust in accordance with any one of the
first six variations, but retains no voting powers. Instead, he ap'
points as trustee a "related and subordinate"" party, who is subser-111. A settlor does not incur tax liability merely because he names himself trustee.
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1974). He must as trustee hold a power which is
taxable. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
112. Elaboration is necessary with respect to the intended use of the term "related and
subordinate" party. Although the phrase is not incorporated in the estate tax provisions of
the Code, it does appear within the income tax statutes. Specifically, I.R.C. § 674 provides
that certain powers vested in the trustee(s) of an irrevocable, inter vivos trust, over the
distribution of trust income and corpus, will not result in attribution of trust income to the
grantor, provided: (1) the grantor is not a trustee, and (2) not more than one-half of the
trustees are "related and subordinate parties who are subservient to the wishes of the grantor." I.R.C. § 672, in turn, defines a "related and subordinate" party as follows:
Related or Subordinate Party. For purposes of this subpart, the term "related or
subordinate party" means any nonadverse party who is
(1) the grantor's spouse if living with the grantor;
(2) any one of the following: The grantor's father, mother, issue, brother or sister;
an employee of the grantor; a corporation or any employee of a corporation in which
the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of
voting control; a subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an
executive.
For purposes of sections 674 and 675, a related or subordinate party shall be presumed
to be subservient to the grantor in respect of the exercise or nonexercise of the powers
conferred on him unless such party is shown not to be subservient by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Our use of "related and subordinate" party, however, is intended to be more expansive
than the foregoing definition. Since our purpose in enumerating these variations on Byrum
is to point out situations in which the settlor passes on wealth while retaining control over
the transferred assets, our definition of a "related and subordinate party" is intended to be
sufficiently broad to include any individual who, by virtue of the nature of his relationship
with the settlor, finds himself predisposed to do the settlor's bidding, thereby enabling the
latter to effectively control the assets placed in trust. And it is obvious that the definition
is not so broad.
section 672(c)
set forth
The in
narrowness
of section 672(c) is brought home in Estate of Hilton W. Goodwyn, 32
T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 740 (1973) [hereinafter Goodwyn f] and Estate of Hilton W. Goodwyn, 77
T.C.M. (P-H) 1011 (1967) [hereinafter Goodwyn 1].
Those cases involved the same facts. Two attorneys were appointed successor trustees of
various irrevocable, inter vivos trusts created by Hilton Goodwyn and were given broad
discretionary powers over the distribution of trust income as well as over the investment and
distribution of trust assets. The trustees proceeded to entrust these powers to Goodwyn so
that he "exercised complete control with respect to the purchase and sale of trust assets,
investment of any proceeds, and the determination of the amounts, if any, to be distributed
to. the respective beneficiaries." 32 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) at 752.
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vient to the grantor's wishes. ' ' 3
10. X transfers stock in trust to a "related and subordinate"
trustee without formally retaining voting powers and without an
agreement with the trustee that he (the trustee) would vote the
stock in accordance with the settlor's wishes, and yet, despite the
absence of such an understanding, the trustee delivers the proxies
to the settlor.1'4
11. X transfers stock to a "related or subordinate" party with
an understanding that the donee would vote the stock in a manner
In Goodwyn I the principal question was whether the de facto power over the trust
exercised by the grantor caused it to be taxable to the grantor's estate under section
2036(a)(2). Goodwyn II raised the issue of whether the same power warranted attribution of
trust income to the grantor under section 674. In Goodwyn I, it should be noted, the court
characterized the trustees as unrelated and in Goodwyn II the trustees were found to be
"independent" within the meaning of section 674. In the former case, the court, placing
reliance upon Byrum held that Goodwyn's exercise of trust powers "through the cooperation
of unrelated trustees" was not an enforceable right and therefore triggered no tax. In Goodwyn
I the court similarly reasoned that the grantor's de facto control did not constitute a right or
legally enforceable power and therefore no attribution of trust income was warranted:
Because of Goodwyn's failure to have a legally enforceable right, we have already
held, following Byrum, that the assets of these trusts were not includable in the decedent's estate under 2036(a)(2). Since a similar legal right or power is a prerequisite
under section 674(a), consistency appears to require the same decision with respect to
the applicability of this section.
77 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1025.
For present purposes, the Goodwyn cases are significant because they teach us that even
though the trustee is "independent" within the meaning of section 674, he still can be susceptible to the influences of the settlor and hence allow the settlor to control transferred assets.
For the very fact that the trustees had turned over their fiduciary power "lock, stock and
barrel" to the grantor, Goodwyn, indicated their inclination to abide by the wishes of the
latter. Indeed, the court itself, in Goodwyn I, implicitly recognized this when it observed: "It
would be indeed an unusual situation for a grantor to appoint trustees, whether corporate or
otherwise, in the expectation that such trustees would, where given a choice, act contrary to
the wishes of the donor." 32 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) at 754.
Goodwyn I and II suggest, then, that in order to encompass all those situations in which
the grantor is able to control transferred assets through exercising influence over the trustee,
our definition of a "related and subordinate party" cannot be limited to the parties enumerated in section 672(c), but must include a trustee who, based upon the facts of his relationship
with the settlor, is shown to be predisposed to carrying out the settlor's wishes. It is in this
sense that we employ the term, "related and subordinate party." We recognize the difficulty
in some contexts of placing a value in traditional accounting methods on "influence," but at
this stage we will hold that problem in abeyance.
• 113. This situation is discussed in text accompanying notes 53-65 supra, in connection
with Estate of Beckwith v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 242 (1970). Administrative powers are more
easily taxed under the income tax provisions than under the estate tax provisions. I.R.C. §
675; Brogan, Use of Grantor Trusts Imperiled by Maze of DisparateIncome and Estate Tax
Rules, 44 J. TAX. 69 (1976).
114. Cf. Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401 (Ct. Cl. 1976), discussed in text
accompanying note 70 supra; McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959)(income retained); similarly, see Skinner v. United States, 316
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
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reflective of X's wishes." 5
12. X, by reorganizing the capital structure of the corporation
into two classes of stock, passes the large number of shares, the nonvoting stock, to others, who will obtain the benefits of growth while
6
keeping the voting, non-growth stock, that gives him control.1
13. X transfers stock to an "independent" trustee, for example,
one that is not "related or subordinate" to the grantor. Such a
situation would incorporate the fact that section 674(c) of the Income Tax Code permits, for income tax purposes, an independent
trustee to hold extremely broad powers to distribute or accumulate
income and/or corpus without requiring taxation to the grantor. In
this type of situation the trustee's discretion need not be established
by any "ascertainable standard." The section would be utilized by
grantors to appoint their attorney or accountant, considered
"independent" of them, as the trustee. However, it is also extremely
likely that these individuals will follow the requests of the grantor
in the exercise of their discretion as trustees. The question arises
then as to whether or not this can be done for estate tax purposes
to circumvent Byrum?
Although some of these variations do not constitute taxable
transfers and still others may in the future invoke taxable consequences, we emphasize here a process, employed through careful
manipulation by estate planners, to place their dispositive instruments on the non-taxable side of a statute. Whether or not these
specific variations will be reached by the tax code in the future, they
suggest the type of arrangements that draftsmen will utilize in the
face of new situations.
II
The foregoing review of the question of retained powers, as
illustrated by Byrum and related cases, indicates acrid disagreement among responsible judges, unclarified congressional and judicial policy and a failure by the Commissioner to both put across his
arguments and to establish a new approach to decisions. The voluminous literature on retained rights is permeated with a sense of
dismay over the lack of coherent results that flow from donative
transfers. The situation is bleak when viewed along with the inadequacies of the 1976 Reform Act, and especially when taking into
account the anemic anti-Byrum amendment. In Part II of this
115. See discussion note 112 supra.
116. See Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 296 (1975) aff'd per curiam, 547
F.2d 32 (1976); see also text accompanying note 79 supra.
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essay, we join in with those who seek serious, deep, pervasive reform. We set out, rather than develop, a series of suggestions towards the aim of a future major overhaul of the system, as well as
towards the aim of a few precise corrections of difficulties.
A.

A Call for a National Debate

On a general level, we call for the commencement of a debate
to begin among members of bar committees throughout the country,
which optimally, with the aid of the informational media, will develop into discussions of national concern of the problems and policies of gift and estate taxes. This debate, which could well last a
decade or more, should invoke the financial support of both the
government and the large private agencies. This bold national undertaking should be approached with the utmost seriousness, with
an understanding of its political nature, and with a commitment to
identify the purposes of the transfer tax, and its relationship to the
basic framework of our society. Towards the realization of a successful national debate, we propose two systematic supports: (1) a preliminary study of materials available to all, and (2) a comprehensive
policy-science study.
Initially, in order to begin the debate at a high level, we suggest
that interested groups take as a model for study and discussion the
article by Professor George Cooper of the Columbia Law School that
appeared last year entitled, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives
on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance."7 Although many persons
may disagree with some of the conclusions in this now widely circulated monograph, it has the incalculable advantage of thoroughness. It demonstrates conclusively, through evidence and analysis,
that our transfer-tax program in this country is not working well.
Moreover, the article treats most problems that are currently arising so that each of us has reference points to which to respond.
Professor Cooper's conclusions and recommendations, as distinguished from his presentation of factual patterns, although not
universally agreed upon, are arranged in a manner which will easily
enable debators and other analysts to present their own views. In
order that each of us can be heard and our views can be consolidated into a presentation to encourage congressional action, it is
suggested that this article by Professor Cooper be used as a common work paper."'
117.
118.

Cooper, supra note 2.
This study is available through the Brookings Institute at a nominal cost.
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The Need for a Policy-Science Study
In addition to a national seminar based on studies of the Cooper
variety, we propose a second research and debate project, a policyscience study. Congress and the large foundations should commence
a complementary major policy inquiry based on political and social
science data and theory. A full-scale study of a sophisticated nature
would include the relevant work of some of America's distinguished
social scientists, as well as incorporate the experiences of other
countries with progressive transfer tax systems. Much of this enlightened scientific material is widely available, but is rarely utilized in the legal process, whether congressional or judicial. Utilization of a successful study of this scope would permit both the legislature and the courts to define and clarify policy in this area. Immediate reforms and long range planning can go together. We are dealing
with topics about which we must ask at least the following questions: (1) To what extent is the purpose of the transfer tax to reallocate wealth, to achieve a redistribution of citizens' claims to wealth,
respect, and power; (2) To what extent is the transfer tax needed
for revenue purposes; (3) To what extent do special units in the
economy, such as the farm or, as in Byrum, the close corporation,
need special shoring up? What does fairness or uniformity mean in
these tax situations?
We suggest here a study based on the analysis of Professors
Harold Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal as they apply to the tax
area. Theirs is an elaborate system which delineates the policy variables with the same degree of thoroughness as Professor Cooper has
delineated the factual problems. The two studies should be taken
as complementary. The Lasswell-McDougal proposals are most
readily available for group discussions in their early article, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest,"' although this article is only suggestive of the full system.
Work on the Lasswell-McDougal system has now reached major
proportions, and has attracted a school of followers. This system has
been applied to studies in criminal law, areas of property law, such
as future interests; land use planning; and especially, international
law.' Although not everyone can be expected to accept each aspect
B.

119. 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
120. Social scientists would know well how to structure a national study based on the
Lasswell-McDougal system. A few suggested readings for those not familiar with the system
would include: H. LASSWELL, A PREVIEW OF PO1JCY SCIENCES (1971); M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD POLITICAL ORDER (1967);
H. LASSWELL, WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES (1965); M. McDOUGAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY,
WEALTH, LAND (1948).
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of this system, or to apply it similarly to each factual example, it
would serve magnificently as the overall reference point in incorporating and assimilating material. Such a major study would presumably lead to political resolutions which might otherwise be carelessly contrived preferences, rigidly embodying simplistic rightwing views of inheritance. If the reformers win out, Congress would
carefully and thoroughly recast the three codes: income, estate, and
gift. Meanwhile, immediate and intermediate reforms should go
forward.

C. A Call for Amendment to Section 2036
On the particular immediate level of Byrum and of what to do
about retained rights, section 2036, with its anti-Byrum amendment, ought to be further revised. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives has passed the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977, which
may soon be enacted into law. It is inadequate in reach but would
make two changes which we quote from the proposed text:
Voting Rights:
"(1) IN GENERAL-For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the direct or
indirect retention of voting rights with respect to a controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of transferred property.
"(2) CONTROLLED CORPORATION-For purposes of paragraph
(1), a corporation shall be treated as a controlled corporation if, at
any time after the transfer of the property and during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent
owned (with the application of section 318), or had the right (either
alone or in conjunction with any person) to vote stock possessing at
least 20 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of

stock. 121
Although the first point is good, it does not go far enough. The
amendment should extend to all forms of control-contractual and
partnership forms as well as those of the corporation. Not as sound
is that portion of the amendment, the twenty percent provision,
which accepts in some measure the older position of the government
of a willingness to waive a claim to retained rights that are insubstantial as measured by an economic de facto test. A better solution
is twofold: (1) to tax all retained stock, whether substantial or insubstantial; and (2) at the same time, to reach all interests, whether
121.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1976 WRITTEN COMMENTS 65-66 (Comm. Print 1977). Received by Com-

mittee on Ways and Means.
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described as powers or rights where there is a de facto retention of
economic control.
We urge that section 2036 (or even the companion sections of
2037 and 2038) be further and much more broadly amended to include not only retained voting rights but the other administrative
and managerial powers as well. The Act should also reach these
powers whether discovered in a corporate form or in another form
such as an express or implied contract. These powers, four in number, are: (1) the power to choose investments; (2) the power to
allocate receipts and expenditures between income and principal;
(3) the power to disapprove the sale or transfer of trust assets; 1 and
2
(4) the power to remove the trustee and to designate another.,
122. The debate as to the wisdom of the proposed technical amendment has begun.
Those who represent interests who seek to narrow the scope of the present version of section
2036 find fault with the proposed amendment. Representatives of this group note the proposal
may fail to limit the imposition of tax liability to instances in which the settlor-controllingshareholder retains voting rights in the stock transferred in trust; that because the phrase
"retention of voting rights" in proposed subsection 2036(b)(1) is now followed by a phrase
such as "in the transferred stock," the provision could tax a shareholder who, despite having
placed corporate stock in trust without retaining the voting rights, maintains the right to vote
other shares of stock, of the same corporation, which shares were not placed in trust.
Conversely, other critics seek to broaden the coverage. In note 121 supra, at 118-25
Professor William J. Brown fears that the use of the phrase "for purposes of subsection (a)(1)"
might not reach subsection (a)(2). He argued that inasmuch as the retention of voting rights
is as likely to result in the settlor's being able to designate the beneficial enjoyment of the
transferred property as it is to enable him to enjoy the transferred property, the statute should
reach both the enjoyment of property by the settlor and the beneficial enjoyment by others.
Professor Brown proposes that the reference to subsection (a)(1) in the proposed subsection
(b)(1) be amended by the deletion of "(1)." We prefer instead that the proposed subsection
(b)(1) be modified in the following manner:
(1) IN GENERAL-The direct or indirect retention of voting powers with respect to a
controlled corporation shall be considered: (i) for purposes of subsection (a)(1) to be a
retention of the enjoyment of transferred property and (ii) for purposes of subsection
(a)(2) a retention of the power to designate the beneficial enjoyment of the transferred
property.
We also disapprove, with Professor Brown, the distinction between rights and powers drawn
by the Court in Byrum. In subsection (a)(2), the word "power" should be substituted for
"right." Such a change is similarly reflected in our proposed language of subsection (b)(1).
Moreover, we also agree, as stated in the text supra, with Professor Brown's observation that
the retention of the capacity to vote any stock is a power which has value and therefore should
be taxed irrespective of the number of shares at the settlor's disposal. To reflect this goal the
reference above to "with respect to a controlled corporation" should be excised and, consequently, as Professor Brown points out, the need for proposed subsection (b)(1) would be
obviated. A third appealing criticism by Professor Brown is that of the use of the terms
"retention" and "rights" in the phrase "retention of voting rights" in proposed subsection
(b)(1). This usage could perpetuate the distinction between rights and powers made by the
Court in Byrum. Under such an approach, only the formal right to vote stock would be taxable
with some de facto powers exempt from taxation. The use of the term "retention" is also bad,
because it fails to reach the Beckwith situation where the settlor who does not formally retain
the voting right is delivered proxies by a cooperative trustee after the creation of the trust.
The insertion of the phrase "on acquisition" after the word "retention" in proposed subsec-

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3:2

D. A Call for Broader Judicial Interpretation
If a statute were to include all of these managerial powers, we
could then expect that, perhaps with the additional help of another
word or two such as "other powers" or "advantageous incidents,"
the court might and should return to the view of the court of appeals
in State Street"3 and find new taxable powers as new contexts arise,
or find in the whole a weight greater than the separate parts. The
courts could put aside once and for all the aphorism, quoted by the
court in Old Colony from Judge Magruder's dissent in State Street,
that with reference to trustee powers "nothing is to be gained by
lumping them together," '24 that, as Judge Aldrich continued, "no
aggregation of purely administrative powers can meet the government's amorphous test of 'sufficient dominion and control' so as to
be equated with ownership." 2 ' The courts could go on to accept
further taxable powers beyond those just enumerated that may, in
an analogous common law fashion, emerge into the matrix of power.
The specific future "power" that a court may wish to reach does not
have to be defined today. That case, again to quote Cardozo, "can
abide the event." In deciding new cases, the courts could embark
on a more adventurous search for tax avoidance. There would then
emerge the exhilirating possibility that the courts would assume the
path of exploration defined by the chain of cases starting at least
as far back as Church, through State Street, Grace, O'Malley, and
the dissenting opinions in Byrum, both the opinion of Justice White
and, in the court of appeals, of Judge Briggs. It is clear from the
theoreticians that property needs to be constantly redefined. The
courts have been slow to follow up the breakthrough on the definition of property made earlier by Maitland with his "bundle of
tion (b)(1) would improve this situation.
Another point made by Professor Brown, is that subsection 2036(a)(2)
should be
amended to reach the retention by a settlor of management powers which
enable him to build
greater value into already transferred assets. Professor Brown suggests
that subsection
2036(a)(2) could incorporate aspects of I.R.C. §§ 674-75. We
agree with this broader
approach, although our final hope is in the judicial process.
Professor George Cooper has additional excellent suggestions that go
to the drafting of
provisions which would not only reach the Byrum-type situation, but
would also subject to
estate taxation the various methods by which an owner can freeze
the size of his estate by
passing on future growth in property, while maintaining control over
it. In offering possible
changes in existing statutes, Professor Cooper focuses on the recapitalization
technique,
which he finds an appropriate "model of estate freezing strategy."
Cooper, supra note 2, at
236. We also enthusiastically endorse this proposal. See also, Pedrick,
Grantor Powers and
the Estate Tax: End of An Era?, 71 N.W.L. REv. 704(1977).
123. State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 642 (1st
Cir. 1959).
124. Id.
125. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 603 (1st
Cir. 1970).
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rights"'26 or even with the Restatement's understanding of property,
as inconclusive as that is, with its emphasis on relationships among
27
persons rather than on "things."' In seeking to define property and
to evalute the importance of claims to it, we need more 2work of the
order of Philbrick, whose great essay remains dormant. ' We need
to seek new strength from such writers as McDougal, Robert Lynn,
John Van Doren, Jessie Dukeminier, Charles Reich, and of course,
such earlier scholars as Walter Hamilton, Gulliver, and Mechem.
No one, however, expects a scholarly revolution in property concepts
at this time. What might well be hoped for is an open-ended judicial
process that would allow the courts on a case by case method to
reach for new definitions of property in order to reach such matters
as the one at hand, which is tax avoidance.
"Control," "influence," "powers," "rights," "interest, "-these
words that describe relationships among persons over wealth must
all be understood as "property," though not always easily measureable in the accounting sense. They are better viewed as important
rights among persons over things (claims to wealth) and are part of
the property whole. They should be subject to taxation upon their
relinquishment. Their retention should postpone the taxation of the
underlying assets such as the larger claims to income and corpus,
until the death of the creator or transferor. We take the position that
all of these claims, whether defined in the more specific and narrower sense as "property," or in the more general, even problematic
sense, as "power," when identified at all, should delay taxation so
that the alleged transfer does not allow growth value to escape the
estate tax.2 9 The firm test, if a donor seeks to obtain the still consid126. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 481, 489 (1886). "[Blut
. . [a]
every gift is a transfer of ownership, and ownership is a right or a bundle of rights.
donor and
the
by
rights
certain
of
relinquishment
(the
489,
at
Id.
rights."
of
a
transfer
is
gift
the acquisition of certain rights by the donee).
127. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Ch. 1, at 3 (1936).
696
128. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691,
(1938).
to
129. The argument there assumes but does not depend on a preference for the "hard
inter vivos transcomplete" rule as distinguished from the "easy to complete" rule in taxing
"hard to
fers. If a donor retains a power, influence, a right, or an interest then we prefer the
Bankers
complete" rule, somewhat along the lines of the recommendations of the American
time of
the
at
taxed
be
should
powers
retained
with
property
on
tax
the
that
so
Association,
93d
Comm.,
Means
and
Ways
House
the
before
death. Hearings on the General Tax Reform
is accepted,
Cong., 1st Sess. 3733, 3870-78 (1973). If, however, the "easy to complete" view
AND GIFT
as with the recommendations of the American Law Institute in ALI, FED. ESTATE
TAXATION RECOMMENDATIONS 41-47, 188-89 (1969) and the Treasury Department in HOUSE

UNITED STATES
WAYS AND MEANS COMM. AND SENATE FINANCE COMM. 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
then a followTREASURY DEPT. TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 384 (Comm. Print 1969),

A
through on the valuation problems of the retained rights and powers needs to be stressed.
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erable benefits of the gift tax, must be that he has undergone the
"wrench of delivery,"'"" to use the phrase
of Mechem, and that, as
put by Justice Murphy, he has retained nothing "more than
a memory. ''131
For this view, the courts should mold into tax analysis
much
of the older property learning going to problems of delivery,
with its
variations on constructive delivery, symbolic delivery, conditional
delivery, and to see the disadvantages of a mechanical application
of authoritative dogma and, at the same time, the importance
of
ritual in the authentication of intent. 32 It is wrong to take
more
seriously than as an example of cavalier dictum, Justice
Frankfurter's statement that the solution of modern tax problems
cannot
turn on the unwitty diversities of the law of property. 33
Rather, it
is more useful to contemplate the thought, well expressed
by Professor Robert Lynn: "Might not a greater proportion of our
best legal
minds, carefully trained in the property lessons of the past,
devote
their talents to recognizing the emerging forms of wealth,
to delineating their characteristics, and to making them more
serviceable
than their traditional counterparts."' 3 4 Statutory change
should include, of course, contracts in which the employee held the
power to
influence the terms of the contract. New progressive interpretations
must reach contracts as well as trusts. The employee benefits
described in the Tully and Farrel cases would indeed be
taxed as
testamentary transfers. A final look at Tully leads to the
conclusion
that the courts must raise a presumption in favor of retained
powers
(and as a consequence in favor of characterizing a transfer
as testamentary rather than inter vivos in situations where the
decedent
enjoyed at some time during his life or at death, powers
of persuasion, a high position in the company, and where arrangements
insuggestive article on this point is that of Pressment, Effect
of Tax Court's Gilman Decision
on Estate Planningfor the Close Corporation,44 J. TAX.
160 (1976). We recognize that grave
problems are shifted over for later discussion regarding the
tremendous problem of valuation.
Ultimately analysts will have to restudy such landmarks as
Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner
335 U.S. 701 (1949), United States v. Estate of Grace, 395
U.S. 316 (1969) and United States
v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
944 (1961). For an interesting
discussion of valuation problems in an income tax situation
see Johnson, Tax Models for
Nonrecourse Employee Liability, 32 TAX. L. REV. 359 (1977).
130. Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels
and of Choses in Action
Evidenced by CommercialInstruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341,
348 (1926); see also Mechem, The
Rule in Lemayne v. Stanley, 29 MicH. L. REV. 685 (1931).
131. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948).
132. Gulliver & Tilson, Classificationof Gratuitous Transfers,
51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941).
133. Helvering v. Hallack, 309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940).
134. Lynn, Legal and Economic Simplifications of the
Emergence of Quasi-Public
Wealth, 65 YALE L.J. 786 (1956).
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volve related and dependent parties). All these should raise a presumption of an underlying agreement. These are the techniques
that at common law, in torts for example, with the newly developing
application of products liability, the courts have been especially
successful with shaping modern policy.
As courts use their innovative powers of interpretation in response to a progressive statutory opening by Congress, the administration can renew, with hope of victory, some of its prior arguments
based on broader but clearly analogous situations. At the very least
the courts should treat consistently the three codes: estate, gift, and
income. The courts should readily and favorably accept, as relevant
to the estate tax, those cases that have helped decide apposite income tax matters. Two examples here will indicate the importance
of this type of analogous thinking. First, the Sunnen case that has
for long been brushed aside needs a focusing into the picture of
estate tax; and second, the argument that carried the court of ap3
peals in Krause v. Commissioner ' needs wider circulation and better understanding. In Krause the Commissioner succeeded in taxing
the settlor of a trust on trust income, since the settlor had retained
incidents of ownership. The court felt that the settlor had retained
stronger incidents in Krause than in Byrum, but the court in Krause
also relied on the position that Byrum, being an estate tax case, was
not controlling in an income tax matter. Whatever the specific form
of anti-Byrum amendments, they should be broad enough to eliminate such unconvincing and unwholesome distinctions.
Counsel and judges should begin to apply, in new tax settings,
the learning that has developed over centuries in the area of property law known as the Rule Against Perpetuities, and its principal
injunction as stated in Lord Nottingham's appealing cry that perpetuities "do fight against God."' In a prescient article, Professor
John Van Doren put the point: "Historically, taxation (or feudal
incidents) and anti-future interest doctrine have been used in tan' 7
dem to adjust wealth and power concentration."' This theme is
developed not only in the work of Van Doren, but by a sturdy school
of policy-trained property scholars, using principally the overall
135. 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
136. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 30 (1682).
137. Van Doren, Redistributing Wealth by Curtailing Inheritance: The Community
Interest in the Rule Against Perpetuitiesand the Estate Tax, 3 FLA. STATE U.L. REV. 33, 39
(1975). Professor Van Doren reviews the idea of Adophe Berle that "control" may be continued through self-perpetuating elite boards and officers, and not really by stock ownership.
This approach is of more interest in reaching the power base of the large corporation than of
the closely held family business, but Van Doren goes on to demonstrate that the power of
"voting stock" may be a "voting stock." Id.
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Lasswell-McDougal system. Shockingly enough, the "reforms" in
future interests (upholding the dead hand) are, as Professor Bordwell observed, reforms "in the wrong direction."131 One sees equally
that the tax reform amendments are too meager to come anywhere
close to eliminating serious tax avoidance, and in the tax field,
the
mistakes and wrong policy turns that can be carefully studied
in
perpetuities law could now be avoided as these problems arise in tax
contexts. 39
In summary, we need a statutory change to signal the courts
towards the creative shaping and sharing of democratic values
through the use of the tax power, with a skill and sensitivity
expected from a corps of judicial specialists that have operated successfully upon doctrine flowing from the Commerce Clause,'
the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
138. Bordwell, Perpetuitiesfrom the Point of View of the Draughtsman,
11 RUTGERS
L. REV. 429 (1956).
139. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); Smith,
Perpetuities in Neu;
Jersey, A Plea for JudicialSupremacy, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 80
(1969), and materials cited
therein; Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and
Reformed, 49 Ky L.J. 3
(1960).
140. Compare the legislation of the Court, interpreting the Commerce
Clause in Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, the Shreveport Rate
Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) with Byrum.
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